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 Abstract: 
Many scholars argue that international institutions have little power to enforce 
laws, punish offenders, or force compliance.  Others stress that international institutions 
are important actors, specifically in the regulation of international trade.  In this paper I 
argue that the recent trade dispute saga over U.S. steel protection provides us with a 
critical case to evaluate the role of the World Trade Organization in settling trade 
disputes and specifically stabilizing expectations of market actors over future steel policy. 
I argue that stock prices can serve as an important tool in answering these questions.  My 
empirical results point to the importance of the WTO and the role of the WTO dispute 
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  2”This is as close to a real trade war as we’ve had for a while” 
    -Gary Hufbauer, trade expert, Institute for International Economics
1
“This is a precious system, the jewel of multilateralism.  However, it is vulnerable and 
can only thrive with the continued support of Member governments, who must be willing 
to abide by the rules they agreed upon.” 
    -Former WTO Director-General Mike Moore
2  
1.  Introduction 
  On March 4, 2002 President Bush announced that the United States was imposing 
sweeping three-year tariffs on imported steel ranging from 8% to 30% to combat a surge 
in steel imports.
3  Major steel producing countries such as China, South Korea and the 
members of the European Union immediately appealed to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), stating the U.S. steel tariffs were a clear violation of multilateral trade rules.  The 
WTO convened a panel to study the dispute and on July 7, 2003 the World Trade 
Organization Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) ruled against the steel tariffs.  After 
considering an appeal by the United States the WTO Appellate Body (AB) issued a final 
ruling on November 10, 2003 striking down the steel tariffs in full.  The AB final ruling 
                                                 
1 “US Steel Tariffs Ruled Illegal, Sparking Potential Trade War: WTO Rejects US 
Appeal; Hot Issue For White House As EU Promises Retaliation.” Wall Street Journal 
11/11/03, A1. 
2 Moore 2003, 109 
3 The legal justification for these tariffs was done through Section 201 of U.S. Trade 
Law. 
  3found the U.S. steel tariffs in violation of multilateral trade rules and authorized 
retaliatory sanctions if the United States did not comply.   
Roughly one year from Presidential elections, President Bush was caught in a 
tough spot between the steel producers (mostly concentrated important electoral 
constituencies), steel consumers (auto manufacturing, tube and wire industries, aircraft, 
etc), and industries being threatened by the retaliatory sanctions (motorcycles, textiles, 
citrus products).   According to the Wall Street Journal: 
The World Trade Organization ruled President Bush’s tariffs on imported steel 
illegal, forcing the White House to either drop them and antagonize workers in 
key electoral states or stand firm and risk retaliatory tariffs on U.S. products by 
the European Union, Japan and other trading partners.  (Wall Street Journal Nov. 
11, 2003) 
 
To the dismay of a number of steel producers and their affiliated unions, President Bush 
announced on December 4, 2003 the lifting of the steel tariffs, ending the trade dispute.  
In this paper I argue that this steel saga provides us with a critical case to evaluate 
the impact of both tariff policy and WTO rulings on U.S. industries.  Although this is a 
clear case of the WTO striking down a domestic government’s trade policy and the 
government fully complying, I argue that the importance of this case to the United States 
government and the uncertainty surrounding it provides a critical case to evaluate the role 
of the WTO in stabilizing expectations over future trade policy.  Did the WTO ruling 
against the U.S. steel tariffs lead to an immediate change in the expectations of market 
actors?  Conversely, did market actors only realize that these sweeping steel tariffs would 
be repealed after Bush’s announcement in his change in policy? 
Answering these questions provides useful insights into an important public 
policy topic.  Equally important, finding a scientific way to test theories on the impact of 
  4the WTO ruling provides us with the tools to evaluate of the impact of international 
institutions on domestic economies.  I argue that stock prices can serve as an important 
tool in answering these questions. Analyzing stock prices movements allows us to 
evaluate how tariff policy and WTO rulings affect market expectations of future firm 
performance.   
It is important to stress that the focus of this paper isn’t a narrow study of the 
impact of WTO rulings on financial markets.  Rather, I argue that the information 
contained in stock prices, expectations of the future, provide us with a novel set of tools 
to analyze the impact of international institutions on domestic economics.  Stock price 
movements can be harnessed to answer substantive questions in international politics.   
2.  International Institutions 
Many scholars argue that international regimes or international institutions have 
limited power to enforce laws, punish offenders, or force compliance.
4  Nation-states 
even within a complex web of international institutions are still essentially in a “self-help 
system” where compliance with international agreements is dependent on either a nation-
state choosing to comply or another nation-state/coalition of nation-states compelling the 
offending state to comply.   For example, variants of Hegemonic Stability Theory states 
that a hegemonic nation-state, a nation-state with a preponderance of power in the 
                                                 
4 The classic works are Waltz (1959, 1975) and Mearsheimer (1994). This is counter to 
former Director-General of the WTO Mike Moore’s (2003, 101) claim that “For what 
makes the WTO unique in the international architecture is the binding nature of its 
dispute mechanism.”   
  5international system, creates and maintains international institutions.
5 Other nation-states 
may benefit from the existence of this institution, but the creation and survival of the 
institution is based on hegemonic leadership in the international system.
6
Other scholars, such as Robert Keohane (1984) have argued that international 
institutions are valuable in that they reduce transaction costs, allow for side-payments, 
and stabilize expectations.  This third benefit of international institutions, stabilizing of 
expectations, is the cornerstone of the World Trade Organization, possibly providing 
major benefits to the world trading system.  The World Trade Organization is valuable if 
countries that violate multilateral trade laws are found in violation by the DSB and the 
country complies with the WTO ruling.
7   
Although Keohane and other scholars argue that these international institutions 
stabilize the expectations on the behavior of other states, for economic actors the micro-
foundation is in the stabilizing expectations of market actors.  In terms of international 
trade, the value of an international institution isn’t in forcing states to comply with 
rulings or constraining the behavior of states.  For market actors, the value of an 
international institution in its ability to reduce risks by stabilizing the expectations on 
future policy affecting firms.  Any study evaluating the impact of the WTO should focus 
on how the institutions affect firms affected by trade policy. 
                                                 
5 See Keohane (1984) and Stein (1984) for an interesting discussion of the literature. 
6 For an interesting theoretical discussion on the impact of international regimes see 
Krasner (1982). 
7 Ideally, the WTO punishment mechanism would deter countries from violating 
multilateral trade laws. 
  6Unfortunately, few studies to date have directly test the impact of the WTO in 
stabilizing expectations of future trade policy.  Some scholars have focused on looking at 
the record of disputes and compliance of WTO cases to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
WTO.
8  Although these studies provide valuable information on the functioning of the 
WTO, they can not directly address the importance question of if the WTO stabilizes 
expectations on future trade policy.  First, not all trade disputes are taken to the DSB and 
many are settled before the final DSB ruling.  By tabulating the compliance record we are 
potentially utilizing a biased sample of disputes. 
Second, and more importantly, we fail to directly evaluate how the WTO affects 
the stabilization of expectations.  For example, the United States has complied/partially 
complied with most WTO rulings, but we can not evaluate how this affects the world 
trading system.  Do market actors “expect” that the U.S. will comply with all WTO 
rulings, even those in politically sensitive cases?  Or, do market actors wait until after the 
U.S. has formally complied with WTO rulings before changing their expectations of U.S. 
trade policy? 
  Before we deal with how to answer these questions, in the next section I provide 
an overview of the WTO and the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.  In the 
following section I argue that stock market movements can be utilized to explore how the 
WTO affects expectations on trade policy. 
3.  WTO and WTO Dispute Settlement 
  On January 1, 1995, roughly 50 years after plans for an International Trade 
Organization were thwarted by domestic political actors in the United States.  This 
                                                 
8 For example see Busch and Reinhard 2004. 
  7organization emerged from the General Agreement and Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 
regime that had dominated the multilateral trade system since the 1940s.  This new 
organization replaced GATT and included a number of new features that both deepened 
trade liberalization and increased the legalization of dispute mechanisms.
9
  Although the new WTO continued to liberalize international trade through 
multilateral negotiations, the largest change in the new institution was the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU).  Under the GATT system governments could seek 
dispute rulings on whether other countries were complying with agreed upon 
liberalizations and if any changes in domestic legislation violated multilateral trade rules.  
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs of these cases, even the most vocal proponents of the 
value of international law could point to a number of institutional flaws in the GATT 
dispute mechanism.  Most obvious of which was the requirement for all parties, including 
the defendant, to agree to both the adoption arbitration panel reports and the authorization 
of sanctions.
10  This is not far from allowing defendants at a criminal trial to veto the 
rulings of the judge and not accept the sentence offered. 
                                                 
9 For an interesting discussion of the impact of further legalization with the GATT/WTO 
framework see Goldstein and Martin (2000).  For a formal treatment of the benefits of 
WTO membership see Bagwell and Staiger (2004).  For an empirical test of the impact of 
the WTO on trade policy, see Rose (2004).  For an excellent overview of the WTO 
dispute mechanism see Lawrence (2003). 
10 See Jackson (1997) and Garrett and Smith (2004). 
  8  The new WTO remedied a number of these previous flaws.  Under the current 
system, any government with WTO membership may file a complaint to the WTO.
11  
Both the defending government and plaintiff government are given sixty days to 
negotiate prior to any WTO action.  Almost half (46%) of all WTO cases are settled 
during this period.
12
  If the complaint is not resolved, the WTO convenes an ad hoc committee, the 
DSB, to investigate the dispute.  The members of the panel are nominated by the WTO 
Secretariate, but all parties are given the right to veto members.  As expected, the panel 
selection is a contentious process and in some cases, if both parties cannot agree to a 
panel in an appropriate amount of time, the WTO secretariate may select the members. 
  Findings of the DSB can, and often are, appealed to the Appellate Body (68% of 
the time).
13  The Appellate Body (AB) consists of 7 judges serving 4 year terms.  Each 
dispute is assigned three judges on a rotating basis.  The AB, far from being a rubber 
stamp on ad hoc findings, can modify or reverse the conclusions of panel findings, but 
may not reverse or modify any facts.
14
  Even with this improved institutional framework, the DSU is no panacea for 
enforcing multilateral trade rules.  First, there is a selection bias in the cases that are 
heard before the WTO.  Countries are often leery of initiating WTO disputes because 
                                                 
11 Only WTO member governments may file complaints. 
12 Busch and Reinhart (2004). 
13 World Trade Organization (2004). 
14 In practice major reversals by the AB are quite rare. 
  9countries often respond with “countersuits” in different trade areas.
15  Simply, utilizing 
the WTO dispute mechanism can trigger a trade war.   
Second, most WTO disputes are settled prior to the final panel ruling.  Sometimes 
the cases are dropped when two countries are suing over the same issue area.  One recent 
example is the Boeing-Airbus battle where both the E.U. and U.S. filed WTO complaints 
in October 2004 over subsidies to aircraft manufacturers.  In January 2005 both the U.S. 
and the E.U. agreed to drop the case and agreed to negotiate directly over the issue of 
aircraft subsidies. 
  Finally, the WTO, as most international institutions, has no ability to directly 
punish offending governments.  The DSU allows for sanctions, but these sanctions are 
authorized by the WTO, and imposed by the plaintiff countries.  That is, the WTO allows 
a country to retaliate by imposing sanctions, but does not guarantee that the government 
has the market power or the political will to impose these sanctions.
16  Thus, sanctions 
are rarely authorized, and even more seldom used. 
Although the WTO is a tremendous improvement over the GATT system, there 
are obvious flaws in the system.
17  In the words of Busch and Reinhart “In fact, the new 
dispute settlement system has struggled to induce the defendant in US-EC disputes to 
liberalize when it counts the most: namely, in the ‘highest stakes’ cases’” (Busch and 
Reinhart 2003b, 466).  The authors find that in the 32 disputes between the U.S. and EC 
                                                 
15 Busch and Reinhart (2002). 
16  Busch and Reinhart (2003a). 
17 See Rosendorff (2005) for an argument on the value of the DSB for providing 
flexibility in the international trading system. 
  10from 1995-2001, 21 ended will full concessions, 3 cases of partial concession, and 8 
cases of no concession by the defendant.  Even if the defendant chooses to comply, the 
timing of compliance is always an issue.  According to Garrett and Smith (2004) in cases 
where the U.S. is the defendant, the WTO rulings forced compliance in a short time in 
some cases (4 days) in other cases the U.S. waited over a year (456 days).  In two cases 
the U.S. was found in violation, but the temporary measures had already expired. 
Clearly, WTO disputes entail a considerable amount of uncertainty.  As stated 
earlier, over half of trade disputes do not even make it to the stage of the WTO ad hoc 
DSB; they are settled prior to any WTO ruling (Busch and Reinhart 2003a).  Second, 
even after the WTO ad hoc committee has issued a ruling, the AB can modify the ruling.  
Third, even after the final AB ruling, many countries negotiate a compromise short of the 
full measures approved by the WTO.  Fourth, the timing of compliance varies 
dramatically.  Finally, in some cases, the defending country never complies.   
In this project I explore the precise impact of the WTO and WTO rulings on 
market expectations.  As evidenced, the WTO rulings, settlements, and compliance are all 
uncertain affairs.  Past studies of WTO compliance have focused on the historical record 
of compliance to make claims about the importance of the WTO and the probability of 
compliance.  In this project I take a different approach.   
I argue that the recent U.S. steel dispute provides a critical case study to explore 
the impact of WTO disputes.  First, this dispute is considered a “high stakes” dispute both 
in the objective economic impact and the perceived political importance of the dispute.
18  
                                                 
18 See Elms (2004) for a discussion of the psychological aspects of trade disputes for the 
negotiators.  
  11Second, this is a case where the U.S. is a defendant, thus providing an important test of 
the value of the WTO dispute mechanism.  Can the WTO “force” the United States, the 
largest economy in the world, to capitulate on an important economic and political issue?  
In the following sections I provide details the steel dispute and show how stock price 
movements can answer these questions. 
4.  The 2002 Steel Tariffs 
Few industries in the world remain as heavily protected as the steel industry.  In 
the United States, after the decline of a number of large U.S. steel mills after World War 
II and the growth of mini-mills in developing countries, steel policy has become a major 
political issue.  Since 1997 over 40 steel companies filed for bankruptcy, while others cut 
jobs and production in response to four decades of weak demand, expanded steel 
production abroad, and ballooning pension (legacy) costs for retired steel workers.  These 
industries are concentrated in a number of industrial cities, complicating the ability of 
these communities to recover from a devastating blow to their manufacturing base.  
Politically, these constituencies remain concentrated, well organized, and housed in 
important electoral districts; a formula for strong political influence. 
During President Bush’s 2000 campaign for the White House aid to the steel 
industry was one of Bush’s strategies to capture voters in the important states of Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
19  On March 6, 2002 President Bush upheld this 
                                                 
19 The United States International Trade Commission’s hearings on steel tariff policy 
provide further evidence of the companies and states involved in steel production.  For 
example, on Oct 1, 2001 the USITC hearings included politicians from Michigan, 
  12campaign promise by announcing the United States would increase tariffs on imported 
steel of 8% to 30%.
20  Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Linnet Deily, in a letter to the 
Director General of the World Trade Organization, justified these tariffs: 
Last June, President Bush launched a multilateral effort to address the root 
problems that have plagued the world steel industry for so long. Over the past 
months, the United States has been urging governments to dismantle subsidies 
and other trade-distorting benefits and reduce inefficient excess capacity. For 
decades, governments around the globe have sought to bolster and strengthen 
their steel producers through massive subsidy programs, closed domestic markets, 
and protectionist regulation. These policies have repeatedly led to overcapacity in 
global steel production and a glut of low-priced steel on world markets. 
 
The U.S. announcement of safeguard tariffs threatened to become one of the 
largest trade disputes since the beginnings of the WTO.  These safeguards not only 
affected a large number of major economies, steel policy is an important policy area for 
politicians in both developed and emerging market economies.
21
The European Union responded almost immediately by appealing for a WTO 
investigation of the U.S. tariffs.  The EU argued that these tariffs were a clear violation of 
WTO rules and constructed case 248 (definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain 
steel products) against the United States on March 13
th, 2002.  Other countries followed 
suit.  Japan and South Korea filed cases against the U.S. on March 26
th, 2002 (Cases 249 
and 251).  In April Switzerland and Norway filed cases (Cases 253, 254) followed by 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Ohio.  See http://www.usitc.gov/steel/default.htm for 
witness lists and Senators present at the hearings.  
20 The analysis and recommendations for this tariff policy was solicited from the United 
States International Trade Commission. 
21 See McGillivray (2004). 
  13cases brought up by New Zealand and Brazil in May 2002 (Cases 258, 259).  Soon all 
major affected steel producing nations filed WTO cases.   
Insert Table 1 
  These sweeping steel tariffs on multiple products affecting a number of countries 
could have lead to a long and complex WTO dispute process.  In most of the major 
disputes involving a number of claimants, each country prepared a separate case for the 
WTO panel.  This dispute is unique in the high level of coordination between the 
claimants, presenting a unified front on the tariffs.
22
The ad hoc DSB panel issued a preliminary ruling on March 27, 2003 against 
essentially all of the new U.S. steel tariffs.
23  The European Union responded to this 
ruling by applauding the WTO and drafting a list of U.S. products, including textiles, 
agricultural products, and motorcycles to be targeted as retaliatory sanctions if the U.S. 
did not comply with the WTO ruling.
24  On July 7, 2003 the DSB issued a final decision 
against the U.S. steel tariffs.   
                                                 
22 See WTO (2003). 
23 http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/panel_report_11july03_e.htm.  See also 
Hufbauer and Goodrich (2003b) 
24 Under the WTO’s Dispute Understanding Article 22, all retaliatory measure has to be 
approved by an article 22 arbitration panel.  These industries are concentrated in swing 
states such as Wisconsin (motorcycles), North and South Carolina (textiles), and Florida 
(citrus products). 
  14The United States appealed this ruling, making a number of sophisticated 
arguments about flaws in the WTO’s analysis.
25  Although the U.S. blanket tariffs across 
ten types of steel products was a clear violation, the U.S. claim that surges in steel 
imports forced the use of steel safeguards has some merit in some steel product cases.
26   
  At this time a considerable amount of uncertainty remained.  There was 
considerable debate about both if the AB would uphold its preliminary ruling and when 
the AB would rule on the case.  Some insiders argued that the WTO panel went too far 
and that there was a serious case of the reversal of the original ruling.  The amount of 
products involved in this case (essentially all type of steel) and the number of countries in 
this dispute also made the probability of a long case very likely.
27    
Even after the WTO AB ruling a considerable amount of uncertainty remained in 
Bush’s response. The President won the 2000 election after a historically close election, 
and had razor thin margins in a number of important steel producing, and steel 
consuming (heavy manufacturing) states.  This electoral calculus was further complicated 
by the threat of EU sanctions in goods produced in important electoral districts.  Some 
media outlets predicted that the U.S. would attempt a new legal challenge in the WTO.  
According to the Wall Street Journal, “But even after weeks of heavy lobbying in 
Washington by both U.S. steelmakers and companies that want the duties eliminated, the 
                                                 
25 See Hufbauer and Goodrich (2003a) for on details on the case. 
26 See Hufbauer and Goodrich (2003a). 
27 Interview with WTO Legal Affairs January 13, 2005. 
  15Bush administration appears to be no closer to deciding what to do in response.”
28  On 
December 3, one day before Bush’s announcement on the lifting of tariffs, newspapers 
were reporting that the steel industry was hopeful that Bush would only suspend the steel 
tariffs, not eliminate them altogether.
29
On December 4 President Bush capitulated.  He argued that the changes in 
international economy prompted the U.S. change in policy and proposed immediately 
lifting the steel tariffs.  President Bush states, “These safeguard measures have now 
achieved their purpose, and as a result of change economic circumstances it is time to lift 
them.”  Leo W. Gerard, President of the United Steelworks of America took a different 
perspective. “Our trading partners obviously engaged the administration in a game of 
guts poker.  Instead of telling them to bring it on, the President blinked.”
30      
The central question of this paper is did the WTO ruling signal an end to the steel 
tariffs?  In this high stakes case, how did the WTO ruling affect the perceptions of the 
future of the U.S. steel industry?  Did market participants understand that the WTO 
prescribed the end of the steel tariffs, or was their still some speculation that Bush would 
keep the steel supports in place?  I turn to stock market data to answer these questions. 
5.  Research Design 
                                                 
28 Wall Street Journal Update November 10 2003 by Neil King Jr. and Scott Miller:  
WTO Ruling Pressures Bush on U.S. Steel Tariffs. 
29 Reuters Update3 December 3, 2003: “Bush expected to lift steel tariffs on Thursday.”  
By Adam Entous and Doug Palmer. 
30 Wayne Washington, The Boston Globe Dec 5, 2003 page A1.  “Bush Lifts Steel Import 
Tariffs.”  
  16 
I argue that stock prices, the expected stream of discounted future dividends, 
measure the market’s expectations on the future of the steel industry.  Formally, standard 
asset pricing models assume that stock prices are simply the sum of the present value of 
future dividends.
31  The price of a firm’s stock is a function of the expected performance 
of a firm relative to the risk free interest rate.  Market participants buy and sell the rights 
to future dividends in the form of equities.  Changes in expectations of streams of future 
dividends will be reflected by an increased demand for this stock.  This leads to an 
increase in stock price. 
Stock prices fall when an event has a negative impact on future firm performance.  
Stock price movements are informative in that they reflect changes in expectations of 
future performance.
32  New information emerges about future steel sales, leading to stock 
prices that adjust to the new set of expectations.    As political events change expectations 
of future dividends, stock prices should adjust immediately. 
  These political events include changing patterns of trade policy.  For example, 
stock prices react to changing patterns of trade protectionism.  As domestic industries are 
protected from foreign competition via tariffs, quotas, etc the stock prices of the protected 
firms increase.  McGillivrary (2003, 2004) finds that stock market movements inform us 
                                                 
31 For Further treatment of the formulas for calculating stock prices, see Brealey and 
Myers (1991).   
32 The efficient market hypothesis suggests that the current asset prices (stock price) are 
the best predictor of the future asset price.  See Leblang (2002).   
  17as to the industries receiving trade protection.  Stock prices adjust to perceptions of future 
patterns of protection.
33
  I use stock price movements to test theories on the impact of the international 
institutions on expectations of future trade policy.  In the WTO steel case, we can 
examine market reactions to specific announcements on tariff policy.  Although the 
recent steel tariffs were originally enacted by the Bush administration, only to be repealed 
at a later date, the question is when was the uncertainty over the steel tariffs resolved?  I 
highlight three plausible hypotheses below.   
International Hypothesis:  Stock prices react to the WTO ruling on the steel 
tariffs. 
                                                 
33 Hays, Stix, and Freeman (2000) argue that political institutions mitigate the impact of 
political information on financial markets.  They argue that complex coalition politics 
and weak central banks limit the financial markets ability to react and adjust to political 
events.  This argument is supported by the empirical analysis of Pantzalis, Stangeland 
and Turtle (2000).  My argument is that the Hays, Six, and Freeman (2000) critique 
strengthens the argument for using equity indexes as a proxy for expectations of future 
economic performance.  That is, political events that have a positive impact on stock 
markets are events that should have a positive long run impact on the economy.  In the 
case of WTO compliance, one could argue that the value of future economic cooperation 
can be measured in stock prices.  Countries that lose WTO cases and refuse to comply 
will lead to overall lower stock market returns.  I leave these tests for future research.   
  
  18One possibility is that stock prices will react immediately to the WTO ruling on the U.S. 
steel tariffs.  In this case, uncertainty is resolved when the WTO rules that the U.S. steel 
tariffs violate multilateral trade rules.
34   
Domestic Hypothesis:  Stock prices react to Bush’s announcement on the lifting 
of tariffs. 
If WTO compliance is uncertain, markets should react strongly to Bush’s announcements 
on steel policy.  Even though the WTO ruled against the U.S. steel tariffs, some 
uncertainty remained about Bush’s response to the WTO ruling.  A second hypothesis is 
that steel stock prices should drop in response to Bush’s announcement. 
Diversion Hypothesis: Stock prices will not react to WTO or domestic 
announcements.  
One final hypothesis is that all actors anticipated that the U.S. steel tariffs were violations 
of WTO rules and were therefore unsustainable.  In this case, steel stock prices will not 
react to announcements by either the WTO or Bush’s lifting of steel tariffs. 
This hypothesis highlights an interesting question.  If all market actors know that 
these tariffs are unsustainable, why do politicians enact them?  I label this hypothesis the 
“Diversion Hypothesis” in that it relates the scholarly literature on diversionary war 
theory.
35  Politicians may engage in international trade disputes, not because they have 
distributional consequences, but for the electoral consequences.  
                                                 
34 This is assuming that the there was uncertainty of the final outcome prior to this ruling.  
I turn this specific issue in the following section. 
35 See Stoll (1984), Levy (1989), Marra et. al. (1990), Gaubatz (1991), Nincic and 
Hinckley (1991), Mogan and Bickers (1992), Richards et. al. (1993), James and Oneal 
  19To summarize, I highlight three testable hypotheses in Table 2.  First, WTO 
rulings may have a substantial impact on the distributional implications of trade policy.  
Steel stock prices may react immediately to WTO rulings.  Second, domestic politics may 
still dominate trade policy, even in areas of clear WTO violations.  There may be a high 
level of uncertainty of U.S. compliance with WTO rulings on important trade decisions.  
In this case, only announcements or policy changes by domestic actors, President Bush in 
this case, has an impact on steel stock prices.  Finally, there is the possibility that neither 
WTO rulings nor announcements on tariff policy have any real impact on domestic stock 
prices.  In this case, the trade dispute has no real distributional impact for domestic 
industries.   
Insert Table 2 
6.  The Data 
To illustrate the potential value of this method I will evaluate the impact of the 
U.S. steel tariffs on both steel stock prices and a U.S. stock market index.  Stock market 
data was collected on the following time series via DATASTREAM: 1) the FTSE U.S. 
Steel and Metals Index (U.S. Steel Index) and the 2) FTSE U.S. Total Market Index (U.S. 
Stock Index) and 3) FTSE World Market Index (World Index) and 4) an author 
constructed index of the major mills affected by the steel tariffs, and 5) data on the three 
largest U.S. steel manufacturers (U.S. Steel, Nucor, and AK Steel).
36   
                                                                                                                                                 
(1991), DeRouen (1995), Meernik and Waterman (1996), Smith (1996), Gelpi (1997), 
Leeds and Davis (1997), Miller (1999). 
36 All three of these indexes are price weighted indexes of a basket of steel stocks, 
the U.S. total market (highly correlated with the S&P 500), or a world market index.   
  20In Chart 1, I present a times-series of the returns of the U.S. Steel Index, the U.S. 
Total Market Index, and the World Market Index for November and December of 2003.  
During this time period the WTO upheld its final ruling on November 10, 2003 and the 
United States agreed to comply with the WTO ruling and lift steel tariffs on December 4, 
2003.  Both of these events are associated with a roughly 3% decline in the U.S. Steel 
Market Index. 
These two dips in the steel stock index, although substantial, look relatively 
normal within the context of the relatively volatile U.S. Steel stock index.  Only through 
a serious empirical analysis can we explore the significance of market reactions to this 
announcement. 
Insert Chart 1 
Insert Figure 1 
This WTO saga is a long chain of events listed in Figure 1.  I argue that the two 
key events to focus on are the WTO AB final ruling on the steel cases and Bush’s 
announcement on U.S. compliance with the WTO ruling. I ignore the pre-tariff period 
and Bush’s announcement of the steel tariffs because information on steel policy is 
slowly diffused to market actors over a long time period, making an event study 
impossible.   
More importantly, why don’t we evaluate the impact of market actors’ reactions 
to the original WTO ruling?  In most WTO cases the original ruling is upheld and in very 
few cases does the AB reverse a decision.  One reason is that the U.S. steel case is 
atypical in that interviews with members of the WTO legal affairs division argued that 
there were concerns that there were potential flaws in the original ruling and that a 
  21reversal was possible.
37  Second, the complexity of case posed problems for the claimant 
governments.  Ironically, the sweeping nature of the WTO tariffs affecting a number of 
countries across a number of steel products made reversal more likely.  The U.S. 
defendant could submit a challenge to the appeal, while historically the complainant 
governments all provide individual and uncoordinated evidence on the case.  The steel 
case is the perhaps the first case where member governments coordinated their responses 
and provided one unified argument against all of the U.S. steel tariffs. 
Third, related to points one and two, the timing of this AB ruling was a surprise.  
Under most circumstances a complicated case such as the Steel case would take a 
considerable amount of time to sort out.  Even with the DSB ruling against the U.S. the 
appeal to the AB could take many months, if not years, if the WTO was forced to write 
detailed reports on each of the issues brought up each of the complainants.  In the end the 
AB settled on one document outlining all of the issues and upholding the DSB initial 
ruling.  By issuing this single document, the AB shaved months from the process.
38
Thus the final AB ruling in this case is an excellent measure how the WTO affects 
expectations of future policy.  This ruling could possible overturn part of the previous 
WTO ruling, and the timing of this ruling was much shorter than the usual cases.   The 
AB ruling was both marked with considerable uncertainty on how/and when the WTO 
would rule on the U.S. steel case. 
Thus, to empirically test for the impact of steel tariffs and WTO rulings on U.S. 
market and steel stock prices, I construct 2 time variables.  The time variables include the 
                                                 
37 Author interview with WTO legal affairs (January 13, 2005). 
38 Author interview with WTO Legal Affairs on January 13, 2005. 
  22final WTO ruling on November 10, 2003 (Final Ruling), and President Bush’s December 
4, 2003 announcement on the final removal of steel tariffs (Removal). (See Table II) 
Insert Table 2 
For the final WTO ruling and the removal of the tariffs, I explore stock market 
reactions on the day of the announcement.  This assumes that the information in the 
announcement is not known beforehand and traders adjust to the new information 
immediately.
39  In the empirical section of this paper I explore other event windows and 
discuss their implications. 
7.  Methodology 
A number of recent scholarly works have explored the relationship between 
politics and stock market movements.  For example, Herron et. al. (1999) identifies 15 
economic sectors where stock prices vary significantly with changes in expectations on 
the 1992 U.S. presidential election.
40  Herron (2000) estimates that had the Labor Party 
won the 1992 British election; the British stock market would have dropped 5% and had 
a surge in volatility.  Leblang (2003) finds that increases in Al Gore’s probability of 
winning the 2000 presidential election led to lower levels of volatility in the U.S. stock 
                                                 
39  In an interview with WTO Legal Affairs on January 13, 2005, there were no claims 
that any information on this case leaked out prior to the issuing of the formal ruling.  See 
WTO 1994 for information on the formal procedures governing information on panel 
hearings. 
40 They used the Iowa Political Stock Market as a proxy for expectations of the 
presidential election. 
  23market.  McGillivray (2003, 2004) uses stock price dispersion to test the impact to 
electoral institutions and redistributive policies. 
  Many studies implemented event study analysis to test for abnormal returns in 
stock data after the arrival of new political information.
41  For example, Gilligan and 
Krehbiel (1988) use an event study of U.S. oil and gas stock prices to estimate the impact 
of rules on congressional outcomes.  Roberts (1990) estimates the impact of the 1980 
U.S. presidential and Senate elections on a basket of defense industry stocks.  Boardman, 
Vertinsky and Whistler (1997) estimate the impact of regulatory legislation, specifically 
on legislation to protect the northern spotted owl, on US firm’s stock prices.  Pantzalis, 
Stangeland and Turtle (2000) estimate the impact of political uncertainty on stock market 
returns in 33 countries from 1974-1995.  
Although the traditional event study methodology has important merits, we are 
not only interested in the level of stock market returns, but also the volatility of these 
returns.  To estimate the impact of political events on the mean and variance of stock 
market returns I employ the same methodology as Leblang (2003) and Bernhard and 
Leblang (2003), a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity model 
(GARCH).  This method allows us to model both the conditional mean return and the 
variance. 
  The GARCH model has a number of features making it useful for time-series 
analysis of financial market data.  One important empirical regularity in stock market 
returns is the presence of volatility clustering.  That is, financial markets do not exhibit 
                                                 
41 See Dyckman et al. (1984) and Prabhala (1997) for a comparison of different event 
study analyses. 
  24consistent volatility across time periods, rather some periods experience higher volatility 
than others.  Standard ARCH models, the parent of the GARCH model, allow us to 
model the variance at time t as a function of variance at time t-1.  The GARCH model, 
models the conditional variance at time t as a function of the variance at time t-1 and set 
exogenous variables. 
Formally, the conditional mean of the GARCH (1,1) model is: 
logR=λ + β1logM + β2W + εt 
εt ~N(0,σ
2) 
logR is defined as log difference in the daily steel stock prices, λ is the constant, logM is 
the log difference of the US total market index, W is a period dummy for different WTO 
ruling periods, and εt is the error term distributed normally with a mean of zero.
42   
I model the conditional variance as: 
σ
2=ω + α ε
2




2) of the time-series is modeled using a constant (ω), lagged errors  
ε
2
t-1 (the ARCH term), lagged variance (σ
2
t-1).  Using this method I can control for the 
serial correlation and kurtosis (fat tails) often found in financial times series.   
8.  Empirical Analysis 
  In the first column of Table 3 I present a baseline GARCH regression where I 
model the mean steel index return as a function of the return of a total market index and a 
constant.  As expected, positive changes in the total U.S. market are associated with 
positive changes in the U.S. steel index.  The conditional variance is model using the 
                                                 
42 This setup is consistent with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe 1984).  A more 
general model of portfolio returns is arbitrage pricing theory (APT) (Ross 1976).      
  25methodology explained in section 7, a GARCH (1,1) model where variance is a function 
constant (ω), lagged errors ε
2
t-1 (the ARCH term), lagged variance σ
2
t-1 (the GARCH 
term).  I also include the log of total shares traded on the NYSE (Volume) into the 
variance equation. 
  In the second column I include dummy variables for the day the tariff was 
implemented (Tariff) the day of the final WTO announcement on November 10, 2003 
(Final Ruling) and the day of Bush’s announcement on the lifting of the steel tariffs on 
December 4, 2004 (Removal).
43  Interestingly, markets reacted negatively to the tariff 
announcement.  One reason for this is that the markets had been expecting a tariff 
announcement and had priced this information into the prices before this announcement 
was made.  The real debate was the level of the tariff, where some media outlets 
predicted a 40% tariff on imported steel, considerably higher than the actual steel tariff.  
Both the final ruling and the removal variables are negative and statistically significant. 
In the third column we present a second GARCH model, dropping the tariff 
announcement. In both models, the substantive impact of the WTO ruling is substantially 
stronger than that of Bush’s final tariff announcement.  For the sake of comparison, I 
include estimates from a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model jn column 3.  The 
substantive results are unchanged.     
Insert Table 3 
                                                 
43 For all regressions I use the date of the announcement as the first trading day when 
traders could buy or sell stocks on the news of the WTO ruling or the Bush repeal of the 
tariffs. 
  26  One potential concern is that information about the WTO final ruling or Bush’s 
intentions on lifting the tariffs may have been leaked prior to the actual announcement 
date, similar to the leaking of information on the implementation of the tariffs.  To test 
for this I analyzed numerous media outlets in the two weeks prior to each 
announcement.
44  Although I found little information about the WTO announcement 
prior to the ruling, I did find some news reports about Bush’s expected response to the 
tariffs. 
  Although most media outlets responded to the WTO steel ruling by arguing that 
Bush’s response was uncertain, some information about Bush’s potential response to the 
steel tariffs was leaked early.  The earliest reports that I found were on November 30, 
where a number of sources argued that Bush was expected to lift the steel tariffs within a 
week.  On December 2, Bush held a campaign fundraiser in the steel city of Pittsburgh, 
where a number of newspapers reported that they expected Bush to announce his steel 
policy.  Although President Bush made no direct mention of his future response to the 
WTO ruling, on the evening of December 3, Bush met with Vice President Cheney, 
members of the U.S. Trade Representatives, and steel industry leaders announcing his 
intentions for the future steel tariffs. 
  Clearly either some of the information on Bush’s policy leaked out or market 
actors were correctly predicting the repeal of the Steel tariffs as early as November 30.  
Traders had the opportunity to react to this information as early as Monday, December 1, 
potentially leading to a sell-off in steel stocks.  To test for this I estimated my model 
using both a dummy for December 1, 2003 and a dummy for the period between 
                                                 
44 I investigated all newspapers in the Lexis-Nexis academic database. 
  27December 1 and December 4, 2003.  In all of these models the WTO announcement on 
November 10 remains negative and statistically significant, and none of the new time 
variables are statistically significant.  I conclude that the major sell-off in U.S. steel 
markets was in response to the WTO ruling and not to Bush’s decision.  
Insert Table 4 
  To test the robustness of this result I utilized an alternative stock price measure.  I 
construct an unweighted index of steel company stocks that are most affected by the steel 
tariffs.  Of the 19 publicly listed U.S. steel produces, 7 firms both produce steel products 
covered by the steel tariffs and are major, traditional steel manufacturers.  I provide more 
details on the coding of this variable in the appendix.  In both sets of regressions, the 
substantive results are unchanged. 
Insert Table 5 
In Table 5 I replicate these same tests using individual company data.  Only five 
U.S. steel companies remain in the top 50 steel producers in the world.  Of these five, 
only three firms have stock data available that is appropriate for this project: U.S. Steel, 
Nucor Steel, and AK Steel.
45  In columns 1, 2, and 3 I present the results.  In all three 
cases the individual stock prices responded negatively to the WTO announcement and 
their reactions to Bush’s announcement varied considerably across firms.  When the 
event window is widened to two days for both the WTO announcement (Nov 10-11) and 
                                                 
45 Other major steel producers include Bethlehem Steel (Chapter 11, purchased by 
International Steel Group), LTV (Chapter 11, purchased by International Steel Group), 
National Steel (Chapter 11) and North Star (owned by the private firm Cargill). 
  28Bush’s announcement (Dec 4-5), I find that only the WTO announcement is significant.
46  
I conclude that although Bush’s announcement may have had some minor negative 
impact on expectations for the future, the real adjustment was in response to the WTO 
announcement. 
9.  Conclusions 
  In this paper I argue that stock price movements can be informative on the impact 
and importance of international institutions on domestic economies.  I use the recent U.S. 
steel trade dispute to illustrate this approach and analyze the impact of the trade dispute 
and WTO’s rule in adjudicating on U.S. steel stock returns and the overall U.S. stock 
market. 
My empirical results show that although the U.S. steel dispute has generated a 
tremendous amount of attention and domestic debate, the final decision on the steel tariffs 
wasn’t decided within the walls of the White House, it was decided within the confines of 
the WTO Appellate panel.  Market participations reacted to the WTO announcement, and 
little evidence suggests that Bush’s response was uncertain.  The World Trade 
Organization effectively stabilized the expectations of market actors. 
These findings point to a potential avenue for exploring the value of the WTO in 
other dispute areas.  Stock prices can be useful in empirical testing existing theories on 
WTO compliance.  Equities price movements provide information on how WTO rulings 
and domestic political responses to these rulings affect domestic firms’ future 
expectations.  
                                                 
46 I also tested the widened Bush announcement window of December 1-4.  Only the 
WTO announcement was significant. 
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Table 1:  WTO Case Timeline 
Date  Country  WTO Case Number
47
3/13/02 EC  248   
3/26/02 Japan  249 
3/26/03 South  Korea  251 
4/2/02 China 252 
4/8/02 Switzerland  253 
4/10/02 Norway 254 
5/21/02 New  Zealand  258 
5/23/02 Brazil  259 
11/11/02 Chinese  Taipei  274 
Source: WTO.org 
 
                                                 
 
  30Table 2: U.S. Steel Stock Price Responses 
 WTO  Announcement  Bush  Announcement 
International Hypothesis  Negative  None 
Domestic Hypothesis  None  Negative 
Diversion Hypothesis  None  None 
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N 1261  1261  1261  1261 
Note:  The dependent variable is the log of the difference in the steel stock price index.  
All estimates utilize Huber-White semi-robust standard errors.  T-statistics are reported in 
the parentheses.  Stata 7.0 was used for the estimated of all GARCH models.   
***=p<0.01 
  **=p<0.05 
    *=p<0.10 
 
  32Table 4: Affected U.S. Steel Firms 
 
Mean Affected  Firms 
   U.S. Stock Index  0.478*** 
(14.69) 
 
   Final Ruling  -2.594*** 
(-57.88) 
 
   Removal  2.982 
(0.56) 
 
   Constant  0.041 
(0.98) 
Variance  





   Arch  0.103 
(1.59) 
 
   Garch  0.722*** 
(2.98) 
 
   Constant  -30.095*** 
(-57.28) 
N 1261 
Note:  The dependent variable is the log of the difference in the steel stock price index.  
Details on the construction of this index are included in the appendix.  All estimates 
utilize White-Huber semi-robust standard errors.  T-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses.  Stata 7.0 was used for the estimated of all GARCH models.   
***=p<0.01 
  **=p<0.05 
    *=p<0.10 
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Table 5:  Individual Company Returns 
 
Mean USX  Nucor  AK 
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N  1261 1261 1261 
Note:  The dependent variable is the log of the difference in the steel stock price index.  
All estimates utilize Huber-White semi-robust standard errors.  T-statistics are reported in 
the parentheses.  Stata 7.0 was used for the estimated of all GARCH models.   
***=p<0.01 
  **=p<0.05 
    *=p<0.10 
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  35Figure 1:  WTO Dispute Time-Time 
 
Pre-Tariff—Tariff—WTO Case—WTO Ruling—Appeal—Final Ruling—Compliance 
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Appendix: US Steel Companies and Affected US Steel Companies 
 
Below is a list of all publicly listed U.S. steel firms available from DATASTREAM.  I 
identify the more efficient mini mills from the older traditional US steel producers (*) by 
utilizing public information from corporate reports and company analysis on the 
production technologies utilized by all firms.  I construct an unweighted index of the 
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